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This culminating project conducted an analysis of IoT security breach case 
studies. The analysis identified numerous vulnerable points: software failure, 
node tampering attack, eavesdropping, code injection, unauthorized access, 
social engineering attack, hardware exploitation, and node insertion. It therefor 
seems that even with the proper tests conducted on vulnerabilities to discover 
solutions, regular end users are unable to apply patches or other technical 
solutions to protect themselves. This project solely focuses on analyzing of 
comprehensive IoT security services that come with devices connected to home 
network. The devices are those provided by the big three: Amazon, Google, and 
Microsoft, on the communication between platform and devices, how they are 
protected, and how costs vary depending on different situations. Also, 
performance differences were analyzed among different solutions based on three 
different scenarios with different number of settings to give a deeper insight to 
users. There are comparisons throughout the paper, but it is to help normal users 
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With the rapid advancements on human technology, it is almost impossible 
to separate human beings from information technologies. It is already prevalent in 
the fields of industries where IoT devices replace human work forces and pairs up 
with the cloud computing for its management and control. Not only the growth in 
the industrial fields, but also dramatic increase on the personal usage of IoT 
technology for the easier and more comfortable lifestyle it brings. However, IoT 
devices are normally equipped with the limited computational power and other 
limited functional capacities. Unlike the industries, where technical experts are 
ready to supplement the integration of IoT and security, normal users who utilize 
IoT at home network usually do not have enough knowledge to implement 
technical controls or understand the vulnerabilities embedded in the system. There 
are numerous real-world security threats awaiting. 
With the rapid advancement on the field of information technology, there 
are various changes that require on demand adaptations by end-users (M. 
Chapple et al. 2021). Without the proper understanding of security threats, end 
users may become victims of cyber-attacks. Especially, users of IoT devices 
connected to regular home networks are vulnerable to the threats due to the lack 
of knowledge on how to manage their home network security. 
There have been numerous security breaches on IoT devices and 




information theft happened through variety of IoT devices: (A. Tejasvi et al. 1-5), 
such as, IP surveillance camera system, IoT coffee port, and even from kids’ IoT 
doll. There were huge number of incidents related to web cameras which are 
used video surveillance to observe their houses whether they are home or not. 
Many of the cases are related to the breaches on video surveillance and people 
were being spied on and recorded without noticing. As a result, ironically, the 
products that are supposed to give people relief are threatening their security. 
Since the fourth industrial revolution, integration of business and 
technology has been booming and most of current businesses cannot separate 
technology from operations. Even small or local businesses transformed their 
payment and delivery system with ever-growing information technology because 
without proper IT integration, younger generation customer tend to leave for 
comfortable alternatives. After several years of development on the field of 
business, it has been spreading throughout home appliances and networks; a 
phenomenon now called IoT (Internet of Things). Since the outbreak of covid-19, 
the tide of IoT has been accelerated dramatically: (J. Steward). A lot of IoT 
devices are now within everyday lives of people that with a simple touch on 
anyone’s smartphone can change the temperature of one’s entire house or even 
huge facility. However, most of IoT users who are depending on home network 
tend to have a lack of knowledge on how to protect their networks. Most users 




modem they purchase or get serviced, even though the network connected to it 
controls everything inside their houses. 
 
Problem Statement 
There are many IoT security solutions out in the market for enterprise-level 
protection but not enough of resources are available for average end-users to learn 
how to securely manage and protect their information and privacy. Despite the 
comfort from IoT devices, it would be extremely hard for people with non-technical 
background to understand complex technology paper to build a sound and secure 
network themselves.  
Therefore, many of the tech-giants are focusing on providing the 
comprehensive platform service that people need. This project focuses on the 
services of three world-famous tech-companies: Microsoft, Google, and Amazon. 
The project will focus on how the security is applied, where it works the best, and 
what would be the best practice for different spheres based on the study conducted: 
(P. Pierleoni et al). 
The major aspects of this project focus on comprehensive services provided by 
three companies: AWS IoT Core, Microsoft Azure IoT Hub, and Google IoT Core. 
Three different services will be analyzed on the aspect of: 
1. What technologies are behind the service? 
2. How are the technologies integrated with other services? 




4. Which field of business or personal need will effectively utilize the service? 











There are numerous IoT devices and applications which support 
comfortable usage of customers in every area of the life. For example, electric 
vehicle charger that support Android application and Bluetooth connection: 
(“Kaspersky Lab Security Services”), smart meter for home electricity usage, 
Fitbit area tracking personal health information, Google Nest thermostat: (G. 
Hernandez et al. 1-8), Tesla electric vehicle, chamberlain myQ for home garage 
door access, drones for work and fun, IP camera system for home surveillance, 
and millions of other devices are out in the market to attract customers with their 
features that will let people have more comfort. However, these devices and 
systems listed have been susceptible to cyber-attacks. Information theft on any 
of the devices connected to home or personal network can lead to a life 
destroying results. 
 In the first case of Chargepoint Inc. Describes vulnerable software and 
firmware where attackers can easily compromise connectivity. EV home charger 
from Chargepoint Inc. was vulnerable on password authentication phase by 
letting attackers bypass the process by simply changing “branch if equal” (b e q) 
to “branch if not equal” (b n e) in debug mode. After successful change, attackers 
could exploit a buffer overflow into the communication of android application and 
BTclassic: Bluetooth executable process. It carried out the denial of service 




home, attackers could disable the user’s entire electrical system, which will lead 
to a physical damage. 
 The second case is about one of the well-known attacks, eavesdropping/ 
Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack which enables attackers to extract network 
information they want. The attack was done on fit-bit aria, a smart scale, that 
helps people log their personal health information. Fitbit aria sends users’ health 
information to their server for users to keep track of their health. Not only the 
health information of users, but attackers were also able to gain access to the 
network by finding service set identifier (SSID) and pre-shared key (PSK) from 
the log files of WireShark. The attack was done in simple steps: 
a. Set up DHCP server to assign a proper IP address 
b. Set up VM to forward IP packets to wlan0 interface 
c. Set up “hostapd” as a wireless access point (WAP) 
d. Use WireShark to sniff network traffic 
e. Attackers gain full access to the network 
Next case is about the device that controls and manages the thermostat 
from tech-giant, google. Google nest was highly susceptible when it was on 
device firmware update (DFU) status. When user press the hard-reset button for 
firmware update, it allows data input with bootable USB stick. Attackers utilized 
this feature and inserted customized image into the device rom. With x-loader 
and u-boot included in the customized image, attackers loaded the Linux kernel 




with Linux inside the attacked nest, attackers gained root access and enabled 
secure shell (SSH) server installation and Odysseus malware to bypass network 
address translation (NAT). Nest, the thermostat, now worked as a botnet of home 
network. It had ability to access every part of the information at home: profiling, 
illegal surveillance, recording pictures, videos, and voices via connected IoT 
devices. 
The fourth case is about a famous product of another major company, 
tesla model S. For tesla owners’ convenience, tesla service centers and charging 
stations have TeslaService Wi-Fi SSID. Users’ credentials are stored in tesla’s 
web browser for auto-connect feature which is extremely comfortable for users. 
However, with fake SSID, attackers were able to redirect the traffic to their 
domain. Tesla’s browser contained software bugs that granted attackers ability to 
read/write memory and execute customized code access shell. After gaining root 
access, they disabled security module, AppArmor. For the last step of attack, 
they used insecure token to bypass gateway integrity verification to access 
Engine Control Unit (ECU), which commands control of vehicles. Therefore, 
attackers obtained full control on both standby and driving modes. With this 
security flaw, not only the intellectual property could be stolen, but terrifying 
results could also be made to anyone in the car. 
The fifth case indicates non-technical but effective method for attackers, 
social engineering attack. The case study on chamberlain MyQ: (J. Margulies 80-




integrity of data. The study shows that this smart home appliance is susceptible 
on being exploited by attackers accessing personal data and control of door 
locks and sensors taken over. As chamberlain MyQ not requiring password 
strength guidelines, it enabled attackers to use brute force attacks, such as, 
dictionary attack, to crack the password and doors to lock and unlock. 
Furthermore, this appliance used unencrypted user datagram protocol (UDP) to 
communicate between server and the device. It helped attackers to easily spoof 
the information during communication and steal the credentials being revealed. It 
shows that with simple dictionary attack and spoofing tool, anyone’s home could 
be on the line of being physically breached. 
The sixth case explains how someone’s toys could be hacked and used 
as criminal weapons. According to study conducted: (I. Astaburuaga et al.), 
Parrot AR 2.0 quadcopter is a drone that was susceptible to open port attacks. 
The case study used Linux network mapper utility (Nmap) to reveal open ports, 
port 21-ftp and port 23-telnet, that are used for remote access. First, ftp was used 
to upload a harmful firmware to the drone and made it inoperable. Next, with 
anonymous ftp login, attacker downloaded password shadow file and removed 
hash for new root password. Therefore, telnet access is granted with no 
password requirements, which means that attackers have gained full access to 
the system. Now the drone can be utilized by attackers on any of their illegal 





The last case is about the surveillance feature that is supposed to help 
prevent overall system of the home network. However, from the case of Edimax 
IP camera system is susceptible from how the basic system works among IP 
camera, controller, and registration on command relay server. Attackers started 
with the public IoT device infected with malware, which acts as a bot and sends 
TCP syn (synchronization messages). Then it explores stateless and guesses 
the mac address which gets the confirmation with acknowledgement of one of 
them. This software bot now registers to the server and gets packet with 
authentication information. Now the IP camera system is in the hand of attacker. 
Above cases indicate how IoT devices that are currently sold in the market 
are not thoroughly designed to protect consumers from security breaches. Of 
course, there are ways to implement the security with additional technical 
updates. However, installing technical add-ons are not an easy task for average 
consumers of IoT devices. Therefore, this project focuses on IoT security 








In this chapter, the paper will analyze different functionality and features of 
three different IoT services that are provided from amazon, google, and 
Microsoft: respectively AWS(amazon web service) IoT core, google IoT core, and 
Microsoft Azure for IoT. The chapter will follow the order of: 
1) General IoT architecture and technical terms 
2) Review of performance tests on each service 
3) Cost evaluation of each service based on the controlled test environment 
and official documentations from service providers 
4) Recommendations based on the performance review and the cost 
evaluation 
Architecture and Terms 
IoT Architecture 
 According to the study: (L. Hou et al. 32-39), The basic architecture of IoT 
can be explained as a 5-layer architecture: perception layer, network layer, 
middleware layer, application layer, and business layer (refer to figure1). The 
perception layer works as sensors and actuators for different features to function. 
The data produced from this layer is sent to network layer, RFID Wi-Fi, 
Bluetooth, infrared, etc., and moves the data to middleware layer. In this layer, 




to application layer. Based on data sent, business layer manages and controls 























 MQTT (message queuing telemetry transport) is a lightweight and simple 
messaging protocol: (D. Happ et al. 41-52). It supports multiple device 
connections which are constrained with low bandwidth. It is one of the best 
protocols that utilizes the communication among IoT sensor device (edge), 
MQTT broker, and monitor device. Two of the main functions include: 
1) Send command to control output 
2) Read and publish data 
The basic concept of MQTT consists of three parts: publish/subscribe, topics, 
broker: 
1) Publish / subscribe = a device can publish message on a topic and other 
devices can receive the message from the topic they subscribed. Topic  
2) Topic = it is an interest on messages that specifies where the device want 
to publish. Topics have levels that are indicated with slashes:/. For 
example, it is indicated as home/kitchen/lamp for specific publication. 
3) Broker = MQTT broker receives every message with filter from devices 
















 MQTT supports three levels of quality of service. QoS level 0 is for 
delivery of one message without the confirmation of reception. QoS level 1 
ensures every message to be delivered for once at least and reception 
acknowledgement message is required. QoS level 2 supports four-way 
handshake communication which ensures that one message is sent to the 
subscriber exactly once. QoS level 1 is used on every service provider in the 
paper, therefore, performance measurements will be based on the round-trip 
time of the messages from publisher. Microsoft Azure IoT Hub offers QoS level 2 
service but not recommended due to increased latency and fluency of service. 
 
API 
 API is an Application Programming Interface which allows multiple 
software applications or hardware-software mixed intermediaries to 
communicate. This interface aggregates requested information from different 
sources of databases, even from third parties, to have an extended features and 
functionalities that users can utilize. API also adds security on personal data 
because applications or software using API to communicate asks for permission 
to access the data. One type of API is REST API, Representational State 
Transfer API. It is a powerful tool that is simple and standardized for industry use. 




architecture between systems using http to operate and gain data from any 
possible formats, such as XML and Json. 
 
SDK 
 SDK is a Software Development Kit that has one installable package with 
a collection of software development tools. It contains software framework, 
complier, and debugger which are to be facilitated. SDKs are usually customized 
for specifically on different hardware platforms or operating systems. It allows 
developers to have easier creation of applications or software with an ability of 





Amazon Web Service IoT Core 
 
Amazon offers comprehensive IoT management service, AWS IoT core, 
that allows users to audit configurations of connected devices and monitor map 
of connected devices for abnormal activities. Whenever IoT core detects 
abnormal activities, it pushes an alarm for users to take any actions it requires. 
The overall process of communication with AWS IoT core starts from connected 
devices reporting their states with MQTT publishing messages on certain topics. 
It has a hierarchical name order system to obtain identities of devices. Then the 
message is sent to MQTT broker which sends message to all subscribing clients. 
Each connected device stores and retrieves their state information in Json file 
with a current state and a desired state. At the last step, rules engine processes 
message and integrates other AWS services. 
 AWS IoT core comes with AWS IoT device management service that 
allows IoT platform to organize, monitor and manage IoT devices. AWS IoT 
device management has features to register devices in bulk and organize 
devices in groups with access policies attached. Also, it is possible to work with 
registry via AWS IoT console or AWS command line interface. Compatibility of 
AWS IoT core shines with device SDKs for Android, iOS, Java, JavaScript, C++, 
Python, and embedded C along with open-source libraries. Along with SDK 
usage, AWS IoT cli and AWS IoT API to create applications with http/https 
requests and device SDKs. Other services are provided which utilizes to collect 




lambda to perform serverless code, amazon simple notification service for 
notifications and alerts, and amazon simple queue for storing data in a queue are 
supported. 
 As mentioned, AWS IoT core communicates in MQTT v.3.1.1 which does 
not support QoS level2. AWS message broker uses MQTT QoS level 1 to publish 
or subscribe, and https to publish. However, it does not allow two or more clients 
to connect at the same time when they have same client id. For the use of rest 
API, message broker supports http protocol. To ensure the security of 
communication and process of data, AWS IoT core is integrated with transport 
layer security (TLS) which ensures all traffics between devices with credentials 
and message broker to be encrypted. For authentication of devices, the platform 





























Microsoft Azure IoT Hub 
 
 Azure IoT hub is a fully integrated service with PaaS solution and SaaS 
solution, respectively, platform as a service and software as a service. PaaS 
solution is provided as Azure IoT solutions accelerator and SaaS solution comes 
as Azure IoT central. Azure IoT hub is utilized as cloud gateway which in AWS 
uses message broker. It accepts data securely and works as a device manager. 
Thus, IoT hub integrates with other Azure cloud services natively, which in turn, 
offers bi-directional communication in the relationship of devices and 
applications. Azure for IoT has a 3-layer cloud-IoT architecture to operate. When 
message arrives at the hub, it is sent to one or more endpoints by its built-in 
message routing function. Similar to AWS IoT core, devices have a virtual 
representation but, in the cloud, twin device. Device identities are stored in the 
twin device in Json document with reported properties presenting current state 
and desired properties. 
 Microsoft Azure offers Microsoft Azure IoT hub device provisioning service 
that enables real-time provisioning of devices connected to hub with no human 
effort required. When devices are registered with IoT hub, the desired twin device 
states are populated. Also, device SDKs are provided with availability on .net, c, 
java, node.js, python, and iOS for simplified connectivity. As mentioned above, 
IoT hub communicates in bi-directional way between devices and applications, it 
also communicates for device-level identity to and from cloud. Azure IoT hub 




over TLS, and AMQP 1.0 with optional WebSocket support. Optional WebSocket 
feature enables the persistent and bidirectional connection between a client and 
server. Different from other service providers, Azure IoT hub offers QoS level 2 
message delivery assurance, but it is not recommended due to the increased 
latency and the impact on the availability of the system. 
 In the security of Azure IoT hub, it is segmented in three areas: 
1) Device: Azure Hub Identity Registry has secure storage for each device 
identity and security key. 
2) Connection: To initiate connection, devices should connect to the Hub not 
connected from the Hub, along with TLS authentication with X.509 
certificate. 
3) Cloud: For user authentication and authorization, Azure Active Directory is 

























Google IoT Core 
 
 Google’s integrated solution for IoT is Google IoT Core which comes with 
comprehensive features. The architecture of Google IoT Core has two main 
parts: device manager and protocol bridge. The main function of device manager 
is to register devices with the service. On the other hand, protocol bridge utilizes 
two protocols, HTTP and MQTT, to connect and send data from devices to the 
cloud or vice versa. The whole process of data flow comes in this order: 
1) Google IoT Core gets the data sent from devices and directs the data 
received to Google Cloud Pub/Sub: Enterprise message-oriented 
middleware that has message ingestion service. 
2) Messages go into Google Cloud Data Flow, a pipe-line service, which 
process and sort data for different cloud services. 
Each device registered to the IoT Core is represented with ID and full resource 
name is used to identify devices. Google IoT Core has a special feature that 
differs from other platforms previously discussed. It allows users to define custom 
metadata, a state from cloud, and a configuration. 
 Like the other two IoT solution platforms, Google IoT Core supports HTTP 
and MQTT for data communications and management of devices. By utilizing 
MQTT, devices cannot maintain connection to the IoT Core, but they can send 
requests and receive responses. With MQTT, devices can send publish requests 
to specific topics and offers QoS level 0 and 1 from MQTT bridge. Like other 




its own command line tool: gcloud. With the use of console or APIs client library, 
operations are possible on C#, Java, NodeJS, GO, PHP, Python, and Ruby. The 
already versatile IoT Core also natively integrates with Cloud ML, Data Studio 
and DataLab, which are big data and machine learning analysis services from 
Google. 
 Different from other service providers, Google IoT Core uses Json Web 
Tokens for authentication of each device with public or private key. To increase 
the level of security, IoT Core integrated RSA for secure data transmission and 
Elliptic Curve algorithms to verify signatures. For the security of communication, 
TLS 1.2 protocol is required for MQTT connections for the use of root authorities. 
To manage access, authentication, and authorization on IoT Core API, Google 








Figure 5. Google IoT Core Architecture with Integration 
  
















The analysis is referred from previously conducted test: (P. Pierleoni et 
al). The test was simulated on the setting of one computation machine with 
following features: Intel Xeon X5650 (x2) CPU, 12 MB cache, 2.66 GHz, 16 GB 
RAM with Ubuntu 18.04.1 LTS. To obtain the concurrency of the tests, clients are 
implemented in GoLang developed by Google. Test environment was controlled 
with different parameters implemented: MQTT broker endpoint, scenarios based 
on different number of clients, number of messages, interval between messages 
in ms, size of messages, and Pub/Sub QoS. However, even in the strictly 
controlled testing environment, the performance of cloud service, which is one of 
the fundamental parts in IoT services, may vary in many situations. Thus, 42 
different measurements for each simulation are made. For example, 2 tests per 
day in different times over 3 weeks. Each simulated test computed mean value of 
the cloud service time for each simulation and its standard deviation writing 
results to their database. However, the limitations are applied due to the 






The test was conducted with one client device connected up-to the value 
of 100 mps and increased the number of clients from 1 to 600. Each client had 
the fixed sending frequency of 10 mps. Azure IoT Hub was the only exception 




On this next scenario, the test conducted was based on a single 
subscriber that subscribes to all topics and more clients publishing message on 
its own topic. However, Google IoT Core and Microsoft Azure IoT Hub do not 
allow direct wildcard subscription, however they allowed forwarding messages to 
other additional services. On Google platform, all virtual devices are registered in 
a registry which has related topic in Pub/Sub service. Each device sends 
message to its MQTT topic and IoT Core forwards the message to Pub/Sub. On 
the other hand, Azure IoT Hub allowed native integration with one or more 




In this last scenario, single producer generated 10 mps in a single topic 








Cost analysis will be conducted based on the official document from IoT 
service providers. 
Billing system of AWS IoT Core charges separately: 
1) Connectivity usage 
a. Metered in 1-minute increments based on the total connected time 
of devices: $0.096 per million minutes 
2) Messaging 
a. Metered on the number of messages transmitted: $1.20 below 1 
billion messages, $0.96 for next 4 billion messages, $0.84 over 5 
billion messages 
3) Device state storage usage (Device Shadow) 
4) Device meta data storage usage (Registry) 
5) Message transformation and routing usage (Rules Engine) 
Rates differ based on selected regions. 
 In the case of Microsoft Azure IoT Hub, costs are managed in two levels of 
service: Basic edition, Standard edition. Each level has three different tiers of 
service. Each tier has limits on daily message, throttling will be applied after 




charged monthly. To sum up, customers of Azure IoT Hub will be charged based 
on the number of Hub units and the amount consumed in month. 
 Costs on the usage of Google’s service is calculated on how much data is 
used in a month. Google IoT Core has four tiers of costs calculated differently. In 
case of creating, reading, updating, and deleting device connections will not be 
charged. However, Google’s solution applies the minimum message volume as 
1024 bytes, which means messages below 1024 bytes will be counted as 1024 








Performance Analysis Result 
One-to-one 
On this scenario, the basis is to conduct the cloud service times in relation 
to the number of messages published per second. Basic concept of this scenario 
is based on setting the number of publishers is equal to the number of 
subscribers and each is assigned on a single topic. Result of the tests showed 
that Google IoT Core responded faster than other IoT service platforms between 
150 mps and 750 mps. AWS performed better on the range, which was out of 
150 mps – 750 mps, but overall performance for daily usage is better with 
Google IoT Core. Even with the less load conditions on Azure IoT Hub, average 
service time took much higher than competitors. Surprisingly, all platforms 
provided stable performance even with the increase in load. 
Different result came out when the number of clients was fixed to 100 and 
the load on message broker was increased. The test result showed even more 
stable performance for all platforms, however AWS performed slightly better on 
every mps difference. The most surprising part of the test results is on Azure IoT 
Core which showed the most symmetrical distribution overall. However, all of 








In the case of Amazon, it was worth noting the sharp increase on 
message loss when the mps was exceeding 400 mps, 40 clients were 
connected, and each client sent 10 mps. Significant message loss was depicted 
on exceeding 70 clients with 5% message loss and tremendous increase at 800 
mps of 20% loss. After 810 mps, AWS stabilized at 42% message loss rate. 
The performance result showed similar result to the result of previous 
scenario. In the environment of increasing the number of clients from 1 to 600, 
Google IoT Core showed significant increase in cloud service time after reaching 
4000 mps sent by clients with 10 mps/client. Compared to Google, Amazon IoT 
platform showed less increase in cloud service time at the same point. However, 
this result does not impose the meaning that the tested services are not 
functioning normally because it was due to the limited ability of QoS 1, which 
delayed the forwarding intentionally. Even in the different scenario, same result 
was brought out from Azure IoT Hub. It seemed different scenario did not affect 
the performance of Azure. 
 
Many-to-many 
Google’s cloud service time was lower than both Amazon and Microsoft 
beyond 15 connected subscribers. For the section of below 15 subscribers, AWS 
had the lowest cloud service time. Shockingly, Azure’s IoT Hub forwarded 




IoT Hub followed the previous results on having the lowest gap between outliers. 
When the test started with one subscriber, Google, Amazon, and Microsoft 
respectively showed the cloud service time of 26.479 ms, 24.991 ms, 160.567 
ms. However, when the number of subscribers reached 300, the difference was 
26.7%, 68.1%, and 7.1%, respectively in the same order. 
 
Table 1. Different Scenario-Based Tests Comparison 
 One to One Many to One Many to Many 
Google Stable at 26ms 
throughout 
1000mps to 





Stable at 26ms 
throughout 1000mps 




from 31ms to 44ms 
and stabilizes after 
5000ms at 45ms 
Stable at 20ms from 
0 to 170 connected 
subscribers / Stable 
at 25ms from 200 to 
250 connected 
subscribers 




Stable at 26ms until 




Stable at 25ms from 
1 to 100 connected 
subscribers / 
Increase from 25ms 
to 37ms at 150 to 
220 connected 
subscribers / Stable 
at 40ms from 220 to 
300 connected 
subscribers 
Azure Stable at 160ms 
throughout 1mps 
to 100mps 
No difference Stable 160ms to 
170ms throughout 0 








Cost Analysis Result 
 Table below shows a different costs variation of tiers: 
 
Table 2. Azure IoT Hub Costs on the Number of Daily Messages Per Unit 
Tiers Monthly Cost / Unit Message/Day/Unit 
Free Free 8000 
Standard 1 $25 400,000 
Standard 2 $250 6,000,000 
Standard 3 $2,500 300,000,000 
Basic 1 $10 400,000 
Basic 2 $50 6,000,000 
Basic 3 $500 300,000,000 
  
Table 3. Google IoT Core Pricing Model Based on Data Volume 
Price per MB Monthly Data Volume 
$0 Less than 250 MB 
$0.0045 From 250 MB to 250 GB 
$0.0020 From 250 GB to 5 TB 










Table 4. Cost Comparison Based on the Number of Devices Connected 
Number of devices Azure basic Azure standard Aws Google 
1 ~ 6 $10 Free Below $15 Free 
7 ~ 70 $10 $25 Below $3 Below $10 
70 ~ 250 $10 $25 $3 - $15 $10 – $45  
250 ~ 1000 $50 $250 $15 – $56 $45 – $185 
1000 ~ 4100 $50 $250 $56 – $230 $185 – $810 
4100 ~ 10000 $500 $2500 $230 – $560 $810 – $1440 
10000 ~ 50000 $500 $2500 $560 – $2500 $1440 – $4640 
50000 ~ 100000 $500 $2500 $2500 – $4800 $4640 – $8640 
100000 ~ 420000 $500/$1000 $2500/$5000 $4800 – $17700 $8640 – $16300 
420000 ~ 500000 $1500 $7500 $17700 – $21058 $16300 – $17815 
 
The price analysis is based on each device connected continuously and sends 
one message per minute of 1kB. Monthly traffic volume is calculated in: 
[Number of connected devices * 1440 messages/day * 30 days] 
Some sections of costs are underlined to highlight with platform offers the lowest 
costs. The table will help potential users who are considering to utilize one of the 





DISCUSSION AND AREAS FOR FUTURE PROJECTS 
 
After conducting thorough review on different real world case studies of 
current IoT device security vulnerabilities, there are numerous active threats 
prevalent. Mostly, devices were susceptible on its own software or firmware that 
the communication between devices and server could be intercepted by 
attackers for malicious uses. Possible attack vectors varied from the software to 
node itself. Also, the possibility of damage from the impact varied tremendously 
due to the nature of different devices. However, the most critical point of the 
studies indicates that the damages from manufacturers’ overlooked security 
vulnerability should not be the burden of rightful users. Therefore, normal users 
should consider utilizing Cloud IoT platform as a solution for their promising 
security on personal information. Since the theft of personal information would 
result in reputational, financial, physical, and many other disastrous results. 
To implement the optimal solution, the paper analyzed the tests done by 
Pierleoni et al. which conducted three different scenario-based tests on Cloud 
based solutions, respectively: Amazon IoT Core, Google IoT Core, Microsoft 
Azure IoT Hub. Even though all three platforms used the same communication 
protocol, MQTT, they had different architectures using unalike processes. Tests 
were conducted to compare service times with fixed message size and 




platform. Performance analysis showed similar result for AWS IoT Core and 
Google IoT Core, but the performance of Microsoft Azure IoT Hub was 
significantly lagging behind compared to the other two platforms in every aspect. 
Not only the performance of different solutions was analyzed and compared, but 
also the pricing model is organized in the paper for easier comparison. However, 
test itself imposes the limitation of study due to the limited number of connected 
devices and fixed packet size since the tests are intended to help normal users’ 
choice on which platform to utilize for their own best use. 
As stated above, imposed limitations of scenario-based tests included free 
tier limitations and only tested on the increasing number of devices and 
messages, not on the decreasing number. Free tier was restricting the number of 
connected devices and messages which could be a possible obstacle for users 
who are facing different situations or surroundings. Future studies will be 
conducted on different paid levels to conduct how each three platform behave 
differently. Also, there will be a study on different behaviors based on different 
packet sizes and communication protocols, such as, HTTP and AMQP. It is 
important to conduct performance evaluations on different load levels but there 
should be a continuous study on current vulnerabilities and threats since the 











IOT = INTERNET OF THINGS 
DOS = DENIAL OF SERVICE 
MITM = MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE 
VM = VIRTUAL MACHINE 
SSID = SERVICE SET IDENTIFIER 
PSK = PRE-SHARED KEY 
DHCP = DYNAMIC HOST CONFIGURATION PROTOCOL 
DFU = DEVICE FIRMWARE UPDATE 
WAP = WIRELESS ACCESS POINT 
SSH = SECURE SHELL PROTOCOL 
NAT = NETWORK ADDRESS TRANSLATION 
UDP = USER DATAGRAM PROTOCOL 
NMAP = NETWORK MAPPER UTILITY 
TCP = TRANSMISSION CONTROL PROTOCOL 




TCP-ACK = ACKNOWLEDGEMENT MESSAGE 
IP = INTERNET PROTOCOL 
HTTP = HYPERTEXT TRANSFER PROTOCOL 
AWS = AMAZON WEB SERVICE 
RFID = RADIO-FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION 
MQTT = MESSAGE QUEUING TELEMETRY TRANSPORT 
QOS = QUALITY OF SERVICE 
API = APPLICATION PROGRAMMING INTERFACE 
REST = REPRESENTATIONAL STATE TRANSFER 
XML = EXTENSIBLE MARKUP LANGUAGE 
JSON = JAVASCRIPT OBJECT NOTATION 
SDK = SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT KIT 
TLS = TRANSPORT LAYER SECURITY 
AMQP = ADVANCED MESSAGE QUEUING PROTOCOL 




MS = MILLISECOND 
KB = KILOBYTE (1024 BYTE) 
MB = MEGABYTE (1024 KB) 
GB = GIGABYTE (1024 MB) 
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